Microsoft has been dominating the market for PC operating systems (OS) for the last two decades. This paper analyzes the decision of …rms to standardize on the mainstream OS family and assesses whether upgrading to the latest version within the MS family is a substitute for using niche OS. We address the following questions: 1) How likely is a …rm to standardize on the Microsoft family? 2) How quickly will a …rm upgrade to a new version of the mainstream system? 3) Which niche operating system is a …rm likely to use, if any? We …nd that upgrading and niche usage seem to be substitutes to some extent, but that larger and more IT-intensive …rms will rather use niche systems than upgrade to the latest Windows version.
Introduction
Microsoft's operating systems have long dominated the market for Personal Computer Operating Systems (PC OS). Since the introduction of Microsoft DOS (Disk Operating System) in 1983, Microsoft has commanded a market share of around 90% for newly purchased PCs. This dominance has extended over several generations of Microsoft systems (in particular DOS, Windows 3, Windows 95, Windows NT, and Windows 2000) and countless version upgrades (such as Windows 3.1, 3.11 etc.). Despite Microsoft's dominance, however, not every …rm uses exclusively their operating systems, and this is the focus of this paper. In particular, we ask whether using the latest version of the mainstream Microsoft family in our dataset (Windows 95) and usage of a niche operating system are substitutes, complements, or if usage and upgrading decisions are taken independently of each other. Using detailed cross-section data, we attempt to capture these interdependencies and …nd determinants of upgrading and niche usage of PC operating systems. We …nd that upgrading and niche usage seem to be substitutes, and that …rms with more diverse needs, and external links will tend to standardize less, while …rms that improve the performance of their basic OS will be more standardized.
Related literature
The empirical literature on markets with network e¤ects has increased in the past years. 1 With the availability of new data and the development of econometric techniques, network externalities have been shown to exist in PC spreadsheets (Gandal 1995, Brynjolfsson and Kemerer 1996) , VCRs (Ohashi 2003) , CD players and disks (Gandal, Kende and Rob 2000) , DVD players (Dranove and Gandal 2003) , and ATM machines (Saloner and Shepard 1995) . The computer industry has received particular attention in the literature. The impact of advertising on the competition between the IBMMicrosoft-Intel standard and Apple/Macintosh has been analyzed in Greenstein and Salant (1999) . The e¤ect of the intensity of competition between the two formats on di¤usion speed has been documented by Koski (1999) . The common message of these studies is that a larger installed base has a positive e¤ect on the value of the technology. Taking this argument one step further, a standardized market seems possible and likely, which con…rms the theoretical results of Arthur (1989) and Arthur et al. (1987) , namely that a market exhibiting signi…cant unbounded increasing returns will eventually settle on one industry standard. 2 This result has been re…ned in a number of ways in the literature. Farrell and Saloner (1986b) show that if the preference for variety (i.e. heterogeneity) in the consumer population is large, standardization might not occur. Bental and Spiegel (1995) analyze a model of vertical product di¤erentiation and …nd that with network e¤ects, the largest network commands the highest prices, but still multiple networks can exist in equilibrium. Farrell and Saloner (1986a) show that when a new generation technology emerges, the transition to the new technology might occur prematurely, causing a market split between generations where a standardized solution would be preferable. Common to these theoretical studies is that even though there are some bene…ts to standardization, a market need not standardize on one technology, and this non-standardization outcome can in fact be an e¢ cient outcome. The stability of a dominant position has also been studied empirically by Breuhan (1998) in the spreadsheet and word processing markets. She …nds that following the introduction of a new product generation, switching costs across systems decrease, so that niche products may be able to challenge a leader's dominance following a product upgrade.
Finally, work by Hendel (1999) models the demand for personal computers with a multiple-discrete choice model. Firms simultaneously choose which types of PCs and how many of each type they should purchase. He assumes that computers ful…l certain tasks within an organization, and that …rms will select the pro…t-maximizing option for each task, which then generates a distribution of di¤erent types of PCs within an organization. Network e¤ects across tasks however are not considered in his model. This paper is the …rst (to my knowledge) to empirically address the tradeo¤ between standardization and variety using intra-…rm usage data. By focusing on the usage of niche products and the degree of standardization, it also looks at the stylized fact that, in many network markets there is a dominant standard and a fringe of other products that struggle to survive. This di¤ers from much of the work on standards battles in the early stages of an industry's life cycle, and of many of the empirical studies on more ma-ture markets that are concerned mainly with establishing the existence of network e¤ects. By assessing the impact of network e¤ects on within-…rm standardization, this paper aims to o¤er new insights on the viability of niche products in almost standardized markets.
The Operating Systems Industry
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Operating systems provide the basic instructions and functionality for PCs. While early operating systems were little more than converters of an instruction set encoded on punch cards into orders for the processor, more recent operating systems ful…ll much more extensive tasks. Even before the advent of personal computers, increased memory and more diverse tasks performed by the computer required operating systems to allocate computing resources to multiple tasks (multitasking or time sharing). The latest operating systems designed for personal computers now come with networking capabilities, …le management systems, virus checkers and hardware diagnosis tools as built-in basic functions.
Bill Gates is quoted as saying that
for opportunities with network externalities -where there are advantages to the vast majority of consumers to share a common standard.' 4 The source of network e¤ects is mainly through indirect channels: An OS is not a standalone product, but can only be used in conjunction with complementary products, the most important of which are a processor 5 and end-user applications. An operating system which does not have a su¢ cient number and range of compatible applications will not be attractive to consumers, which in turn decreases the incentives for applications programmers to develop applications, thus initiating a vicious cycle. 6 The industry's history shows that there are indeed advantages for a large share of the market to using the same system, as would be expected in industries with signi…cant network e¤ects.
The evolution of the PC OS market
When the MITS Altair 8800 was introduced in 1975 as the …rst personal computer, Bill Gates and Paul Allen adapted the Beginner's All-purpose Symbolic Instruction Code (BASIC) programming language that had been developed a decade ago for the Altair's needs. Within a few years, Microsoft (the trade name was registered in late 1976) had started selling BASIC to other clients such as DTC, General Electric, NCR and Citibank as well and launched another programming language, FORTRAN-80, an improved version of FORTRAN. By 1981, they were part of the dominant PC family. IBM, which had previously relied on exclusive in-house development of their products'components, had outsourced the development of the processing unit to INTEL and the operating system to Microsoft for their personal computer. Microsoft purchased an operating system from Seattle Computer Products for $50,000, re…ned and adapted it to the IBM PC, and named it Microsoft Disk Operating System, MS-DOS. Prices for the …rst PCs started at $1,565, and PCs were distributed via mass consumer outlets such as Sears, Roebuck & Co. and ComputerLand. Two years later, Microsoft's …rst operating system upgrade was released, MS-DOS 2.0. The market for PCs took o¤, and within 18 months, IBM had sold 136,000 PCs, alongside a large number of IBM-compatible PCs that used INTEL's 8088 processor and Microsoft's DOS. In the mid-1980's, MS-DOS' market share was reported to be 85%, resulting in an initial public o¤ering raising $61 million.
In Two other operating systems also held minor market shares in the PC OS market. The Macintosh/Apple standard ran on incompatible hardware and was especially competitive in the graphics design market. It is often argued that the Apple/Mac standard was in fact superior to the "Wintel" standard, but market forces early in the industry's history con…ned Apple to a niche role. Unix, initially developed by AT&T, was a so-called open standard, meaning that the basic source code was freely available. Over time however, several (mostly proprietary) variants of it were developed, 8 the most successful being Santa Cruz Operation's Xenix and SCO Unix, 9 Sun's 7 In order to be certi…ed as a Windows application, software needed to be able to run on both Windows 95 and Windows NT without losses in performance. 8 http://www.computerhope.com/unix/unix.htm 9 In fact, Xenix was initially developed by Microsoft who licensed the source code to software OEMs (Original Equipment Manufacturers), including Santa Cruz Operations.
Their variant of Xenix then …nally became known as SCO Xenix
Solaris and Univel, a joint e¤ort by Novell and Unix System Labs. 10 Even proprietary versions, however, were still considered di¢ cult to operate and mainly suited for high-end users. Recently, Linux emerged as the leading operating system of the Unix family, but similar to previous versions, its strengths lay mainly in operating servers rather than providing a platform for end users.
Standardization in the PC operating systems market
This section highlights a number of qualitative features of the PC operating systems industry. The dataset we use is a 1998 cross-section of 4729 UK sites gathered by ZD Market Intelligence, now Harte-Hanks Market Intelligence. It contains a vast amount of information on the information and communications technologies used on a particular site. 11 It is described in more detail in Appendix B. Our variable de…nitions and descriptive statistics are also in Appendix B. The aggregate …gures on industry trends in OS usage have also been provided by Harte-Hanks Market Intelligence, but do not form part of our later …rm-level analysis.
Network e¤ects suggest that large groups of users will want to use the same operating system. An operating system with a large installed base should be attractive for applications developers, generating indirect network e¤ects. For homogeneous …rms, this would imply unanimous choice of the dominant operating system. Even if …rms are heterogenous in their needs, a number of factors make it costly to run multiple operating systems within a single …rm. Firstly, since most OS have a distinctive user interface, endusers will learn how to work on particular operating systems. Similarly, system administrators will learn how to deal with problems arising from particular operating systems. Therefore, end-users and IT personnel create an individual and …rmwide body of expertise for a particular operating system, which will result in a cost that a¤ects switching to (or concurrent use of) another OS. 12 Secondly, computers -and especially the applications that run (http://www.computerhope.com/unix/xenix.htm). 10 http://www.att.com/news/1291/911212.ula.html 11 We use the terms "…rm" and "site" interchangeably. 12 According to Rukstad et al. (2000) , this switching cost can run up to four times the purchase price of the operating system. on them -will occasionally exchange data and, more generally, be required to operate jointly within and across …rms. This could be via direct communication of employees using email, workers changing jobs, resource sharing within a …rm, or providing external access to a task that is being performed by a PC in this …rm. Since an operating system provides a basic set of instructions that ensures the portability across computers (running the same OS), more use of an operating system within the …rm implies more potential for communication and consequently higher bene…ts from using this speci…c system.
The existence of substantial switching cost therefore also makes it attractive to vendors to get …rms to standardize on a particular OS, which creates an incentive for suppliers to lock-in consumers to their standard. 13 This appears to play a signi…cant role in the operating systems market. In the (for now) …nal judgement on the Microsoft US antitrust case in November 2002, Microsoft was explicitly prohibited from retaliating against OEM manufacturers that were "shipping a Personal Computer that (a) includes both a Windows Operating System Product and a non-Microsoft Operating System, or (b) will boot with more than one Operating System" 14 . This suggests that Microsoft has been trying to get OEMs to standardize and lock-in to Microsoft Operating Systems. The peculiar pricing policy employed by Microsoft (Microsoft charged a royalty per PC sold, irrespective of Microsoft OS being installed or not) also gives OEM manufacturers incentives to install Microsoft OS on their computers (at zero marginal cost), which again discourages the emergence of niche Operating Systems.
To see if the forces favouring standardization from the supply-and the demand side are indeed overwhelmingly strong, we …rst investigate aggregate market share of Microsoft operating systems in the PC industry. Then, we use detailed …rm-level data to see if …rms do indeed standardize on a single operating system. Microsoft's aggregate market share has remained almost constant over the years, while market shares of the individual OS have varied dramatically in the same time period. Overall, the variation of mainstream Microsoft market share was less than ten percentage points during this time period, suggesting that Microsoft succeeded in marketing successive generations of mainstream operating systems.
Industry trends in OS usage
Firm level statistics
About 10% of PCs run on other OS. Two extreme cases could generate this result: First, one …rm out of ten uses a single, competing OS. Second, all …rms run one-tenth of their PCs on another OS. The two cases have di¤erent implications. The …rst indicates strong intra-…rm network e¤ects, while the second implies network e¤ects through availability of complementary programs for speci…c tasks. Table 1 gives the distribution of the number of OS used within …rms in 1998, split by using mainly (i.e. > 50%) Microsoft products or not. We treat all mainstream Microsoft operating systems as a single operating system since MS-DOS, Windows 3.x and Windows 95 were speci…cally designed to share a large portion of the source code and thus to ensure high compatibility. We can see from the Table that 1071 of the 4344 …rms (or 24.65 % of MSusers resp. 22.65% of all …rms) using predominantly mainstream Microsoft OS (i.e. the right column) are using a mix of Microsoft products (namely, MS-DOS, Windows 3, and Windows 95) and another product concurrently. The Table also shows that …rms not using mainly Microsoft products (i.e. the left column) often use two operating system families (in 241 cases of 385 in total). This suggests that mainstream Windows products indeed ful…ll most tasks within an average …rm, while other operating systems seem less extensive in scope or appeal to …rms with more diverse needs. It is also evident that there are much less than the maximum of 90% of …rms using exclusively Microsoft products, which is an indicator that …rms may require functions absent in mainstream products in other (niche) systems, and run these OS on a subset of their PCs. Apart from using niche OS in addition to the mainstream MS option, …rms can also utilize additional functions if they upgrade to the most current version of Microsoft's mainstream family in 1998, Windows 95. Table 2 illustrates that even in 1998, only about half of all …rms have made use of that possibility, and that MS-DOS is still used in one quarter of all …rms. 16 To summarize, upgrading and using niche OS both provide the …rm with added functionality over the status quo. Both options have their respective advantages and disadvantages. Since a new generation OS uses a signi…cant portion of the existing code, the potential for di¤erentiation from the current version is limited. On the other hand, the common heritage ensures intergenerational compatibility at least to some extent. Niche OS are not bound by existing code of the dominant OS which permits them to concentrate in- stead on the "holes", i.e. missing tasks, left by the mainstream system and therefore speci…cally target a minority of adopters dissatis…ed with the currently dominating OS. Users of niche OS, however, will experience a loss of intra-…rm network e¤ects, since compatibility is conceivably lower between PCs running on operating systems by di¤erent vendors. A compromise strategy would be adoption of a niche system by Microsoft (Windows NT), which adds to the tasks ful…lled by mainstream MS OS, but achieves greater compatibility, in particular with the then-current version of Windows, Windows 95.
15
There is considerable heterogeneity in the upgrading and niche usage behaviour across …rms, which raises the question if …rms are likely to substitute one for the other, or if both niche usage and upgrading occur jointly in …rms. To analyze this and related topics, we address three separate questions before synthesizing our conclusions.
1. First, we look at determinants of intra-…rm standardization on the Microsoft OS family. We regard MS-DOS, Windows 3 and Windows 95 as a single (mainstream) OS family and identify explanatory variables that in ‡uence the degree of standardization (or the expected share of PCs that run on Microsoft).
2. We then study …rms'speed of upgrading to new versions of Microsoft OS. We examine the proportion of PCs within the MS family that are running on Windows 95 (as proxy for the speed of upgrading) and the proportion of PCs running on MS-DOS (as indicator for inertia in abandoning an old product).
3. Finally, we examine usage of operating systems outside the mainstream family. In particular, we will examine whether …rms use Windows NT or not, i.e. how "far" their niche system is from the mainstream standard. This identi…es …rms that sacri…ce compatibility for increased variety.
The coe¢ cients we obtain from these regressions give an indication of the degree of substitutability between upgrading and niche usage. For example, if …rm size has a positive e¤ect on upgrading and a negative e¤ect on niche usage, large …rms prefer to upgrade rather than use niche OS, implying that the two are substitutes with respect to …rm size.
Assumptions and Hypotheses
Bene…ts from OS Usage
Similarly to Hendel (1999), we assume that within a …rm, an operating system has to ful…ll di¤erent tasks. A single OS will not perform all tasks equally well, i.e. it is specialized on a subset of them. If an OS performs additional functions, this will come with a certain performance loss. A …rm requiring two subsets of tasks with di¤erent "optimal" OS will therefore trade o¤ additional costs 17 of running multiple systems with the performance loss from having an OS perform certain tasks suboptimally. Consider the following net bene…t function of OS i:
where
is the sum of the standalone values of the V di¤erent tasks t ful…lled by the OS, B i (N ) are the network bene…ts from N users, and C i (N ) are the costs of installing and maintaining an OS for N users. We make the following assumptions about this bene…t function:
A1 states that an OS is better at doing some tasks than others and that an OS will be purchased to ful…l tasks in decreasing order of OS/task match. For example, an OS may be purchased mainly for its user friendliness but may also be used for data sharing and transferring. It seems reasonable to assume that di¤erent OS have di¤erent strengths (Appendix A contains a table with the characteristics of the OS used in our study) and that average performance per task decreases with increasing task heterogeneity. A2 imposes decreasing marginal network bene…ts. Assuming that there are network bene…ts across users and tasks, the marginal bene…ts from having, say, users from unrelated departments running the same OS are smaller than the bene…ts from withindepartment compatibility. A3 assumes economies of scale in OS setup and maintenance cost: On the one hand, per-unit prices of OS typically decrease with the number of units purchased, and on the other hand it is cheaper to provide maintenance for n users using a single OS than for n di¤erent OS with one user each.
This allows for niche products and mainstream products to coexist: An OS that delivers utility mainly through high network bene…ts and low perunit costs may be used jointly with a high-performance, few-tasks OS. For our estimations now, we have to make some assumptions about the degree of di¤erentiation between the di¤erent OS in our sample: Suppose a …rm has three options to ful…ll non-standard needs that arise. It can either upgrade within the mainstream OS family to a higher performance OS, it can use a non-Microsoft niche OS, or it can purchase Windows NT as an intermediate solution.
We make the following assumptions about the di¤erent groups of OS in our sample:
Mainstream Microsoft OS. MS-DOS, Windows 3, and Windows 95, are assumed to ful…ll the basic functions required in a …rm. While later versions are better (i.e.
, the focus is still on general rather than specialist use. We assume that compatibility among these three systems is higher than with any of the other OS.
Niche OS. We assume that non-MS OS are perfectly (maximally) horizontally di¤erentiated relative to the mainstream OS. While this is clearly a simpli…cation, experiments with an ordering of niche OS in terms of their "di¤erentness" to MS OS yield essentially the same regression results, however at the expense of explanatory power and degrees of freedom. Since our main concern is the tradeo¤ between compatibility and specialization, grouping non-Microsoft OS into one "niche"category seems a sensible compromise.
Windows NT. Windows NT was marketed as a compatible, but advanced version of the mainstream Microsoft OS. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that NT will only be di¤erentiated within the limits of the Microsoft standard, while it will still be compatible with the mainstream. Firms that place a high value on compatibility will therefore prefer a solution involving Windows NT. The variables contained in our dataset can all be thought of as in ‡uencing the OS bene…t function, either by decreasing the cost of running multiple systems, or by changing the bene…ts from running specialized systems.
Mainstream MS OS
Data Issues and Hypotheses
Endogeneity Issues
As mentioned previously, the data used in our analysis is a single 1998 crosssection. Modelling a dynamic decision using a cross-section entails several shortcomings. For example, it is not possible to put a date on the adoption decisions of a niche OS or the new-generation OS. We also are not able to estimate the e¤ect of introducing a new-generation mainstream OS on the overall degree of dominance of Microsoft. Furthermore, variables might be jointly determined and problems of endogeneity cannot be fully eliminated without using lagged variables or other suitable instruments. Additionally, by only distinguishing between Microsoft and non-Microsoft niche systems, we sacri…ce some of the distinguishing features of the speci…c operating systems. Despite these limitations however the question of substitutability or complementarity between upgrading and niche usage can still be addressed satisfactorily with our data, and it allows us to draw inferences about the tradeo¤ between …rmwide compatibility and variety. Further, our dataset is very rich in information on the individual …rms, enabling us to assess the e¤ect of several relevant variables on the niche or upgrading decision. In our estimations, we select instruments that are highly correlated with our factors of interest while posing the least possible problems of endogeneity.
Hypotheses
Several factors can in ‡uence the bene…ts of using one or several OS. We will focus on three factors: Task diversity within the …rm, external links requiring additional tasks, and …rms'e¤orts to improve OS performance via more suitable (we will shortly de…ne our interpretation of this) end-user applications.
Internal Diversity
The e¤ect of task diversity is essentially a decrease in the marginal bene…ts s 0 t of a mainstream OS, since the tasks taken on are increasingly di¤erent from the bread-and-butter operations that mainstream OS have been designed to perform. A niche OS on the other hand essentially experiences an increasing network bene…t (A2) and may achieve a more e¢ cient scale of units (A3).
Hence, if tasks within an organisation are diverse, a single operating system may not be su¢ cient to achieve satisfactory performance in all of them. On the other hand, a niche OS may reach a su¢ cient scale within the …rm, which makes the compatibility advantage of Windows NT over other niche OS relatively less important. Consequently, we expect more diverse …rms to be less standardized and to be using more "distant" niche OS. The e¤ect of internal diversity on upgrading within the mainstream is less clear. On the one hand, upgrading to a recent version may improve performance for a large number of tasks, creating a tendency towards quicker upgrading. On the other hand, niche OS may be serving more of the "critical"tasks, so that performance for the mainstream OS is less important, thus decreasing the need for upgrading. Our regressions will show which e¤ect dominates. We measure internal diversity through …rm size and IT intensity:
Log of Firm size (SIZE). Larger …rms will typically have more varied needs that are increasingly distant from the standard tasks a mainstream OS ful…lls. For example, larger …rms typically require security systems or …le sharing facilities.
IT sta¤/Total sta¤ (IT_STAFF). An IT-intensive …rm will typically have more sophisticated needs. IT-workers are better informed about possible functions of operating systems, leading them to demand more of an OS. 18 
Links (internal and external)
Intra-and inter…rm links are likely to place additional demands on an operating system. In that sense, its e¤ect is similar to task diversity. However, the additional demand refers to a subset of tasks, namely communications tasks (subscript c). Therefore, the weight placed on the standalone value of communications tasks will be higher, i.e. s 0 c is higher for …rms with high communications requirements. Further, we expect that network e¤ects across all PCs will play an important role, i.e. …rms place a premium on compatibility (high B (N )).
While Microsoft's mainstream OS all had some facilities for connecting PCs within the same …rm, connecting computers across sites or making communication between servers and PCs possible was not one of their strengths. We therefore expect standardization to decrease with stronger internal or external links. On the other hand, Windows NT was designed to enhance communications capabilities while at the same time avoiding the loss in network e¤ects from departing from the MS mainstream. We therefore expect use of Windows NT at the expense of more distant niche OS for both internal and external links. External links and the associated need for compatibility also imply that connected computers will want to use the same generation of mainstream OS since backward compatibility was not always perfect. We expect therefore that upgrading will take place at slower pace since the slowest upgrader will be setting the pace for upgrading. On the other hand, using a server often characterizes a technologically sophisticated …rm, thus implying quicker upgrading speed. This tendency would be reinforced by the fact that Windows 95 was designed to be complementary to Windows NT, the OS we expect to bene…t most from server usage. We proxy internal links with a dummy variable for server usage and external links with a dummy for multisite operations. 18 Endogeneity is a potential problem here since OS usage may a¤ect the hiring of new IT sta¤. Since IT sta¤ typically has more diverse tasks than simply maintaining the …rm's OS and therefore many other factors will in ‡uence the level of IT sta¤, we expect the reverse causality to be dwarfed by the direct e¤ect.
Server usage (SERVER). Running a server is similar to being part of a multisite …rm in the sense that additional requirements arise in terms of communication. Contrary to multisite operations however, communication between computers in the same organization has to be ensured.
Multisite operation (MULTISITE). Operating as part of a multisite environment requires tasks that go beyond the standard mainstream OS. What is di¤erent from the more general task variety measures, however, is that the extension of tasks is in a speci…c direction, namely ensuring communication across …rm boundaries.
Enhancing OS Performance
So far, we have implicitly divided tasks within a …rm into standard and specialized tasks and assumed that mainstream Microsoft OS fare best in ful…lling standard tasks. For standard tasks in particular, OS utility derives mostly from of ease-of-use and performance of the associated applications. Microsoft o¢ ce applications are designed to take full advantage of Microsoft's mainstream OS and consequently command a similarly dominant market share in the o¢ ce applications market as in the OS market. A number of …rms, however, choose to purchase o¢ ce applications by other vendors. Sometimes, these choices are by historical accident and the cost of switching to a Microsoft application are too high. 19 For some …rms however choosing a non-Microsoft application simply maximizes the utility derived from standard tasks on a particular OS, i.e. s 0 s is high for these …rms. That is, we can interpret usage of a non-Microsoft o¢ ce application as a "…ne tuning" of the standalone value of mainstream OS. We therefore expect such …rms to be more standardized. On the other hand, the extent of network bene…ts through data exchangeability across applications for example will be lower across di¤erent Microsoft operating systems because applications and OS are now less harmonized. Therefore, the tendency to use Microsoft NT over other niche systems should decrease. Similarly, we expect upgrading to occur at a slower pace, since again applications software and the latest version of the Windows family are not synchronized as closely as an all-Microsoft combination would be. Using o¢ ce applications that are not by Microsoft could be an indicator that a …rm adjusts their mainstream OS to their speci…c needs.
Non-MS Spreadsheet Applications (NON_MS_SS). Customizing the mainstream family by using non-Microsoft applications captures the intuition of enhancing basic tasks in order to be less reliant on non-standard OS. We choose spreadsheets since the degree of standardization has traditionally been lower than for word processing applications (Breuhan 1998) , and since competing spreadsheet programs have not yet adopted most of the leading program's characteristics (Groehn 2000) . 20 In summary, we expect the …rm characteristics discussed above to have the following e¤ects on our questions: It should be noted at this point that our variables are not perfect proxies for the concepts we seek to explore. For example, size may proxy for …rm age and/or the size of the installed base of PCs running on a particular OS. Whenever appropriate therefore, we will discuss alternative interpretations.
Empirical Speci…cations
Intra-…rm standardization on Microsoft OS
We consider two di¤erent speci…cations of intra-…rm standardization. The …rst looks at the log of the "numbers equivalent", i.e. LOG(N_EQ). 21;22 The numbers equivalent is a convenient measure of standardization since it treats standardization as a continuous variable rather than a dichotomous decision. It is the inverse of the "OS Her…ndahl Index" and therefore places higher weight on asymmetric structures with one dominant OS and some niche OS, which is what we observe in many …rms in our sample. On the other hand, it is more re…ned than just the share of the mainstream Microsoft family, which does not take the structure of the niche OS into account. The degree of non-standardization is then characterized by
where 0 i are the parameters to be estimated, X i is a vector of the …rm observables discussed in the previous section and i is a random error term. We also report results from a model in which the decision to use anything else but mainstream Microsoft products is modelled as a dichtotomous variable. This would be more realistic if the …xed costs of setting up an additional OS are high. We assume the existence of a latent variable p which guides the standardization decision such that Where N OT _EXCL = 0 is standardization and 1 is usage of any niche OS on at least one percent of PCs. We also experimented with other speci…cations, such as the total number of OS used in an ordered logit model, 21 De…nitions of our dependent variables are given in Table 7 in the Appendix. 22 Note that we treat the mainstream Windows family, i.e. DOS, Windows 3.x and Windows 95, as a single Operating System. This is because our hypothesis on intra-…rm standardization is essentially a static one, so that we are not asking which generation of the mainstream operating systems family is being used in the …rm. This issue is then addressed in the second set of regressions, which deal with the issue of upgrading.
or creating a trichotomous variable indicating some, little, or intense use of niche OS and found qualitatively similar results. , as proxy for the extent and speed of upgrading. 23 Speci…cally, we use the following equation.
Upgrading within the Microsoft family
By de…ning the dependent variable as the share of Windows 95 of all Microsoft-run PCs, we isolate the process of within-system upgrading. In addition, we run regressions on LOG (1 DOS_SHARE). Since DOS is made obsolete by Windows technology, …rms will replace it over time. Analogous to our …rst set of regressions, we also use a dichotomous dependent variable on Windows 95 usage:
This leads to the following decision rule:
Determinants of niche OS usage
We use an ordered probit speci…cation for the part of the analysis. The need for variety in niche OS is captured again by a latent variable.
Following Figure 3 , we can say that if the need for variety is comparably low, additional tasks can be ful…lled adequately by Windows NT. If it is very high, a (combination of) non-Microsoft OS is required. In intermediate cases, a combination of Windows NT and other OS is optimal. This gives the following rule:
where OS_N ICHE = 1 means using only Windows NT as niche OS, OS_N ICHE = 2 using NT and at least one other niche OS, and OS_N ICHE = 3 using exclusively non-Microsoft niche OS. We estimate the equation using an ordered probit speci…cation. We obtain similar results if we use the share of WinNT of all PCs running on niche systems as dependent variable.
Results
Intra-Firm Standardization
Our results on …rms'standardization decisions are reported in Table 4 . We run the regression on the log of the numbers equivalent (LOG(N_EQ)) with three-digit industry dummies (1), the average industry share of LOG(N_EQ), AVE(LOG(N_EQ)), (1'), and the extent of upgrading (W95_SHARE) in the …rm (1") to capture interaction e¤ects between upgrading and standardization. We also restrict our sample to the non-standardized …rms and include niche usage (OS_NICHE) and W95_SHARE (1"'). As a robustness test, we run a probit regression with industry dummies with non-standardization (NOT_EXCL) on the LHS (2). Notes: * denotes signi…cance at the 5% level, ** denotes signi…cance at the 1% level. Both proxies for task variety, SIZE and IT_STAFF, have positive and signi…cant signs in regressions (1) -(1") and the probit regression in (2). They are not signi…cant in the regression only for non-standardized …rms. It seems therefore that task variety does have an impact on a …rm's decision to standardize: Larger …rms and …rms with a large fraction of IT personnel on their payroll will be more likely to run additional OS on top of the mainstream Microsoft OS. Similarly, the coe¢ cients on internal and external links are positive and signi…cant in all but the restricted sample regressions, indicating that networking tasks are best ful…lled using a non-mainstream OS. Usage of non-Microsoft spreadsheet programs carries a negative and signi…cant sign in all speci…cations, suggesting that …rms improving on the performance of standard tasks will be more likely to remain within the mainstream Microsoft family. The industry average of standardization is positive and signi…cant in (1"), suggesting that either there are industrywide network e¤ects or that …rms in the same industries have similar task structures. The speed of upgrading is positive and signi…cant (at the 1% level in (2") and at the 5% level in (2"')) in the numbers equivalent regressions but not in the probit regression (2) . This may be because the e¤ect of upgrading to Windows 95 is stronger when …rms are not standardized rather than a¤ect the decision to fully standardize in the …rst place. This intuition would also be supported by the increase in magnitude of the coe¢ cient between (1") and (1"'). Finally, we …nd that the type of niche products used and the corresponding "distance" from the mainstream Windows standard does not a¤ect the degree of standardization (2"').
Upgrading Speed
We report the regression results on the speed of upgrading in Table 5 . As our baseline regression, we take the log of the share of Windows 95 of all mainstream Microsoft PCs LOG(W95_SHARE) and again use three-digit industry dummies (3), the average industry share of LOG(W95_SHARE), AVE_W95, (3'), and the OS numbers equivalent of the …rm (3") and again a restricted sample with LOG(N_EQ) and OS_NICHE on the RHS (3"'). As a further test of the robustness of our results concerning speci…cation, we use a dummy indicating any Windows 95 usage (4) and the log of the share of Windows (version 3 and 95) of mainstream Microsoft PCs (5). Notes: * denotes signi…cance at the 5% level, ** denotes signi…cance at the 1% level. SIZE has a negative sign in all speci…cations and is signi…cant in all but (3"'). IT_STAFF is negative whenever it is signi…cant and is only positive in (5). This (weakly) supports the notion that …rms with more varied tasks will upgrade less rapidly than "single-task"…rms. SERVER is consistently positive and signi…cant in all the speci…cations, indicating that internally linked …rms are likely to upgrade quicker. The sign and signi…cance of MULTISITE is not consistent however: It is negative and signi…cant in regression (3), but positive in all others and signi…cant in all but (3"'). It should also be noted that the magnitude of coe¢ cients is consistently bigger for SERVER than for MULTISITE. It appears then that the e¤ect of internal links is strong and robust, while we obtain mixed results for the e¤ect of external links on upgrading speed. NON_MS_SS is negative in all speci…cations providing strong evidence that usage of non-Microsoft o¢ ce applications has a negative e¤ect on upgrading. The coe¢ cient on industry average (AVE_W95) is positive and signi…cant (3'), and the degree of standardization has a positive e¤ect when signi…cant (regressions (3") and (5)) as expected. OS_NICHE carries a negative and signi…cant sign, implying that …rms using more distant OS will upgrade less quickly.
Niche Usage
Our niche usage regressions are found in Table 6 . As in our other regressions, we run several robustness checks: In addition to our set of independent variables, we include industry dummies (6), the percentage of …rms using exclusively or some niche OS, AVE(ALL_NICHE) and AVE(SOME_NICHE) respectively, in regressions (6') and (6"), as well as the values of the other dependent variables, LOG(N_EQ) and LOG(W95_SHARE) in (6"'). Notes: * denotes signi…cance at the 5% level, ** denotes signi…cance at the 1% level. (6): Ordered logit regression with niche OS usage as dependent variable, set of independent variables and industry dummies. (6'): As (6), with industry share of …rms using only non-Microsoft niche OS instead of industry dummies. (6"): As (6'), with industry share of …rms using some non-Microsoft niche OS instead of industry dummies. (6"'): As (6), with log of numbers equivalent and log of Windows 95 share as covariates.
The coe¢ cients on SIZE are consistently positive, but only signi…cant at the 5% level in the baseline ordered logit regression (6) . On the other hand, IT_STAFF, our alternative proxy for task variety, has a positive and signi…cant coe¢ cient in all speci…cations. Jointly, this lends support to the hypothesis that greater task variety will trigger the use of OS that are less compatible with the mainstream but that this e¤ect is more likely to originate from increased IT intensity than from sheer size. Both SERVER and MULTISITE have highly signi…cant negative coe¢ cients. This supports the hypothesis that compatibility requirements and Windows NT's specialized capabilities dominate in such …rms. NON_MS_SS carries a strongly significant positive sign: Firms using non-Microsoft applications are likely to use more distant niche OS. There are strong and signi…cant industry e¤ects (6') and (6"), and the cross-e¤ect of upgrading on niche usage is signi…cant and negative (6"'). That is, …rms that are using more of Windows 95 are less likely to use niche OS. OS_N_EQ on the other hand is not signi…cant in (6"').
Discussion
Our regressions show that task variety, internal and external linkages and their e¤orts to improve standard tasks have a signi…cant impact on OS choice. We consistently …nd strong industry e¤ects, which seems intuitive for a product with strong network e¤ects and task similarity within the same industry. There are also strong interaction e¤ects among the decisions to standardize on mainstream products, to upgrade within the mainstream family, and to use more or less compatible niche OS. Our results seem rather robust with respect to included and excluded variables and functional form.
Task variety
A …rm with more varied tasks will be less standardized, upgrade less quickly, and (conditional on niche usage) use more distant niche OS. Firms therefore will ful…ll their more heterogeneous needs by running nonMicrosoft OS on part of their PCs. That is, …rms will distance themselves from the mainstream simply because their needs require additional functions to be handled by the OS. Upgrading to the latest version of Windows presents no pro…table alternative to these …rms, so that they resort to non-Microsoft products. Firm size, however, could also be a proxy for …rm age rather than task variety, in which case we would expect slower upgrading and possibly a strong legacy e¤ect of older OS. Assuming that non-Microsoft OS have experienced a decrease in their market share, 24 we would therefore expect older (and therefore larger) …rms to be less standardized on Microsoft OS. Table  9 compares the main independent variables split by dominance of Microsoft. From the mean values on L_SIZE we can see that this does not seem to be the case.
Links (ext./int.)
Internal linkages (SERVER) leads to less standardization, but faster upgrading and use of Windows NT as niche OS. That is, …rms running a server will place a high premium on running compatible OS on most of their PCs, which favours simultaneous use Windows 95 and its close relative, Windows NT. Firms that are part of a network of …rms will be less standardized as well and use Windows NT as a niche OS, while the results on upgrading speed are inconclusive. In summary, it appears …rm that linkages will lead to additional task requirements that can be met mostly by using Windows NT.
Enhanced OS Performance
Firms using non-MS o¢ ce applications will standardize more, upgrade more slowly, and use more distant niche OS (if any). Our conjecture that such …rms derive more utility from the basic OS family is con…rmed, as is the expected e¤ect that …rms would rather use distant niche OS because there is less need to maintain compatibility with the mainstream OS within the …rm. Further, when using non-Microsoft applications, …rms have less incentive to use the latest version of the mainstream OS since upward compatibility is likely to be lower compared to Microsoft's own o¢ ce applications. Could the use of non-Microsoft applications also be an indicator of general dissatisfaction with Microsoft products? Possibly, the use of non-Microsoft products suggests a desire for standardization, just not necessarily on Microsoft. Following this interpretation, we would expect that non-Microsoft application users use less Microsoft OS as well. Table 9 however shows that …rms using predominantly non-Microsoft applications are not more likely to standardize on another OS. In fact, the table suggests the opposite since the use of non-Microsoft spreadsheets is higher for heavy Microsoft users.
Interactive E¤ects
All variables (except MULTISITE in regression (3)) have opposite coe¢ cients for upgrading speed and distance of niche usage. This strongly supports the hypothesis that upgrading and non-Microsoft usage are substitutes, since a variable that implies quicker upgrading will at the same time imply less distant niche OS. This is also con…rmed by the cross-e¤ect of LOG(W95_SHARE) and OS_NICHE: Both are signi…cant and negative, even though they refer to separate decisions, namely to upgrade within the currently dominating OS and which niche OS to choose.
What can be learned from this study? First of all, many …rms choose to use a non-Microsoft OS to ful…l at least some of the tasks in their …rm. It seems then that intra-…rm network e¤ects are not overwhelmingly strong or that at least some tasks are not a¤ected as strongly by them as "standard" tasks. Thus, if operating systems are an experience good, it is likely that a better product may be successful after all: There appears to be no huge threshold for niche OS to be used on at least some PCs or for some tasks within the …rm. 25 Second, our study provides some evidence that Microsoft has cemented their dominant position in the market by introducing Windows 95 and Windows NT jointly, with a strong emphasis on compatibility between the two. Internally and externally linked …rms are likely to use both jointly, making it more di¢ cult for niche OS to break in. It is remarkable however that large …rms and IT-intensive …rms are less likely to standardize on the Microsoft family: These are precisely the …rms that seem attractive to OS vendors. In the more recent past, this trend of niche OS gaining ground in large organizations seems to have been con…rmed by the emergence of Linux, which has won several high-pro…le accounts from Microsoft (including the Air Force, the US Postal Service and various government o¢ ces in Germany, France and China, to name a few). Interestingly, and perhaps counterintuitively, the use of non-Microsoft applications seems to strengthen Microsoft's dominance in the mainstream OS market. This may be the result of a "mix-and-match" process in which users pick complementary products according to their preferences and utility from the baseline product is higher as a consequence (Matutes and Regibeau, 1988) . Whether this e¤ect is stable in the long run however has to be questioned given my results on upgrading speed and the distance of niche usage, where …rm usage of non-Microsoft applications works to Microsoft's detriment.
Clearly, this study has some limitations. First, the PC OS market is a very particular one with unique charcteristics such as a stable near-monopoly market structure and close links with complementary products. The applicability of our results to other industries and industries may therefore be limited. Second, our assumptions about the bene…t function and the horizontal locations of the three groups of OS is a crude approximation of what is clearly a multidimensional product and will often be purchased in conjunction with new hardware, a decision we do not take into account due to data limitations. A more re…ned modelling of the OS choice process à la Hendel (1999) may yield more information about the precise nature of …rm's preferences for variety and compatibility, but to arrive at robust conclusions with just a single cross-section may be a di¢ cult task. Finally, we may have omitted variables that signi…cantly shape …rm decisions, such as …nancial data, or the use of other related technologies. Financial data however was not available for a large proportion of our …rms. Information on the use of other related technologies is present in the data, but in a cross-section, questions of endogeneity have to be taken seriously, which is why we chose not to use variables that would su¤er from this problem.
Despite the limitations given above, this study has implications both in terms of the PC operating systems industry in particular and niche products in network markets in general. We …nd that even though aggregate market share has been almost constant for the last few years, …rms are quite heterogeneous in their choice of operating systems. We can also see that in order to ful…ll certain tasks that go beyond the standard OS, compatibility with the dominant system seems to play an important role in the choice of system. A more general dispersion of tasks however, gives incompatible (or less compatible) systems an opportunity to gather a critical mass of users (and tasks) within a …rm to present a pro…table solution. There seems to be a polarization of solutions for …rms that customize their mainstream system: On the one hand, they are more likely to standardize, but if they do not, they are more likely to choose an incompatible OS as their niche OS. On a more general level, our results suggest that network e¤ects can lead to persistence of a dominant standard, but that demand heterogeneity allows for "islands" of a competing technology. This result resonates with the literature on localized network e¤ects, where similar agents standardize on a single technology, but di¤erent populations may well choose di¤erent technologies best suited to their particular needs. 26 Our …nding that upgrading and niche usage are substitutes has important implications for prospective challengers of an industry standard. As a new generation of the dominant standard is introduced, the standard seems most susceptible to losing existing users to a competing technology -a result con…rmed by Breuhan (1998) for the word-processing and spreadsheet markets. As there will almost always be a (temporary) loss in compatibility across generations, the network e¤ect favouring the dominant standard will be weakened and competitors stand a better chance of making inroads into the market. On a static level therefore we con…rm Farrell and Saloner's (1986b) result that if consumers are su¢ ciently heterogeneous, niche products can be sustained in the market, while on a dynamic level, generational upgrades cause a temporary loss in the stronghold of the dominant standard on the industry. While this work clearly calls for additional studies in other network industries and over a longer time horizon, as a …rst look at the question of standardization and upgrading we hope that this study presents a number of interesting results and opens avenues for future research on almost (but not quite) standardized markets. 
A OS Characteristics
B Data
Our dataset is a 1998 cross-section of 4729 UK sites (i.e. organizationally distinct entities, e.g. production facilities) gathered by ZD Market Intelligence, now Harte-Hanks Market Intelligence. The data was generously provided by Luke Spikes and Matthew Shannon. The information is gathered by the …rm through telephone interviews. The full dataset consists of a collection of over 10.000 UK-based sites that gave information about their internal IT landscape and a number of …rm descriptives such as size, SIC group, and others. Among the data provided on the IT landscape were PC and server Operating Systems used, end-user software, IT personnel, in-house programming practices etc.. Sites were eliminated from the sample if they did not report 100% of the operating systems used on site, i.e., if the sum of individual shares reported for all OS did not add up to 100%. They were also eliminated if they were the only site operating within their three-digit industry. We con…ne our analysis to sites using (a combination of) DOS, Windows 3, and Windows 95 on more than half of their PCs, which leaves 4602 observations. To judge whether the surveyed sites are representative of the general population of UK sites, we have to look at the method by which they are selected: Firstly, Harte-Hanks Market Intelligence approach …rms independently and interview their senior IT managers, and secondly, they are provided with a list of …rms by their clients that they would like interviewed. Focusing on senior IT sta¤ ensures that whoever makes the decision to purchase an OS is interviewed. According to Luke Spikes, former CEO of the company, the surveyed …rms from the clients'list have in the past done business with their clients, which generates a bias towards …rms that have previously shown a propensity to purchase IT-related products. Also, the sample contains a disproportionately high number of public sector organizations (e.g. local councils or government agencies). Omitting these entities from our analysis does not change our qualitative results. We also have to ask whether our subsample generates a bias vis-à-vis our full sample. We …nd that sites not reporting 100% of their OS usage are not signi…cantly di¤erent in terms of size and their approximate number of PCs, but they report signi…cantly less use of information technologies. This may either represent a lower willingness to answer detailed IT-related questions or a lower dispersion of information technologies in the …rm. Given that the number of PCs reported is approximately similar, we expect the …rst factor (lower willingness to report) to play a more important role than the second (lower usage).
For the …rms in our …nal sample, Table 7 de…nes and describes the variables used in our estimations. The descriptive statistics for the variables are in Table 8 and a correlation matrix in Table 9 . 
